ASOG Article of the Month - June 2020
ASOG Author: Gareth Davies; Image: Commons.wikimedia.org & unspash.com
Hands down, aviation safety is an essential part of the ASO profession and the aerial remote sensing industry sector. Gareth Davies brings light to one critical part of the safety process – responsibility and management.
Let’s Start With…
H.W. Heinrich (I’ll talk more about him later), he makes a very good point about responsibility and management. What he said is:
“Responsibility for a fault of control over the operating conditions and forces’ in an industrial establishment can be assessed only against the centre of management. This center is that individual or small group of individuals who exert the directing will in that concern. In this centre is the managerial skill which makes for success; while its lack leads on to failure.”
If you remove industrial establishment and insert it with just about anything, it reads the same. If you replace it with any government or military organization, any commercial activity, any flight operation, any sporting concern, any ‘body’ that has management control over other ‘bodies.’ It reads the same. Without saying, this ought to be the first thing management should learn, day 1, hour 1, minute 1 in management 101. It isn’t!
A Perfect Example
In 1988 at the European Space Operations Centre (ESOC) Darmstadt, Germany. ESOC was controlling two satellites that were operationally being used by Inmarsat. It was discovered that two of the four Bolometers (sensors for keeping geostationary communications satellites pointing at the earth) had glitches that occasionally breached its parameters and if two of the four failed then the satellite goes into what is known as ESR (Emergency Sun Requisition) this mean that the satellite effectively ‘flips’ over and the main Communications dish is now pointing at the sun with the main payload switched off. Happy as Larry, all the power (literally ) in the world, with no payload drain.
Two issues here
The satellite is not doing its job, these things are not cheap, but more importantly, the thousands of ships that use the satellite are not doing theirs either because while they are on route, their cargos are being bought and sold on the appropriate spot markets, and at some point during their voyage, you have to tell them which harbor to aim for. In other words, lots of loot involved.
Now, if there was a severe glitch in the sensor, then clearly ESR is the best place for it, lots of sun power no payload, just hang about until the ground boys figure out the problems. If not, and it’s an ESR because of a glitch, then lots of unnecessary costs.
When an ESR is triggered, you have 15 minutes to figure out if there is a serious issue or just a sensor glitch. With that much at stake, 15 minutes will disappear faster than ice cream on a hot day.
As already indicated, ESR was the bogey man ESOC lived with. Its handling and the Brobdingnagian ramifications of getting it wrong, terrified a young operational ESOC.
Aside from the prime ground station antenna (in Belgium), you immediately configure a second antenna. The term ‘Spacecraft Emergency’ is the space equivalent of the nautical ‘Mayday.’ All ‘hands’ to the rescue, in this case, a second antenna (indeed all available and useable antennas).
“Houston, we have a Problem!”
The MARECS (MARitime European Communications Satellite) spacecraft controller, in this case, Fred Blogs, calls the Network Controller (the positions that controller and coordinates the ground antennas and the in-house computers) which is me. I react, call the ground station to configure the second antenna, and wait.
Chatter and noise within the MARECS control room (all voice loops are open) makes me realize something is not right. It takes me 25 seconds (please don’t forget ice cream on a sunny day) to realize to my horror that I have asked the ground station to configure their antenna (a 30-meter dish, so not a switch) for the wrong satellite.
I issue a ‘break break finger trouble my end’ command and get the ground station to configure the correct antenna for the right spacecraft, get that online, all within 90 seconds. As it happened, it was a glitch, but if because of a glitch and not enough time to ascertain the same and had not stopped an ESR…..I know the proverbial hitting the fan is on its way.
What Went Wrong?
The grilling was appropriate. I was asked if Fred Blogs had got it wrong. I knew F.B. well and knew him to be a top-notch controller, so I was not prepared to go there. What was I thinking? What was my mindset?
In any event, all the voice loops were recorded and would come out in the transcripts, and did. F.B. had indeed asked me to configure for MARECS.
The management was good enough to want to get the bottom of this as I was.
F.B. has clearly said MARECS and not the OTS (Orbital Test Satellite that EOSC was still controlling but also had the same bolometer glitch issue, so had often called for a second ESR avoiding antenna).
Light bulb moment. F.B. had been on OTS for five years; he was OTS. He had recently been promoted to MARECS, but no-one had officially informed the rest of the operations department.
Because of the ESR Bogey-Man, we were all attuned to speed. I had associated F.B. with OTS, and not his clear request for a MARECS configured antenna and had configured for his voice and not what he had said.
These were unmanned missions, but the ramifications are clear when such an ‘event’ can jeopardize lives.
Brilliant Management
Suffice it to say all promotions after that were published, and I survived being promoted into that very control room some 12 months later.
Their point was to point at my manager (which in this case was them) and ask that if we are his managers, why don’t we know what he doesn’t know!
Look Past the Coal Face for Answers
Looking back at the recent comments I made on the IIMC incident in California article in March, I wonder what the management mindset was (perhaps still is) regarding the transportation of VIPs in such conditions, especially when you consider that the nearby LA ASU had grounded their fleet. I have met some of the LA ASU boys, safety first, all day long.
For those who have never heard of H.W. Heinrich, he was not at ESOC or anywhere near operations per se. Nor was he military or in any branch associated with the military.
The interesting part of this story, H.W., was an occupational safety researcher for a major insurance company whose clients were complaining about excessive insurance premiums. He wrote, suggesting, here is the kicker, that if you show more concern for your workforce, the accident rate and therefore insurance premiums go down.
This, then off the wall, ‘truism,’ and more lifesaving thinking gems can be found in the seminal work ‘Preventing Industrial Accidents, ’ which was published in, wait for it………. 1935! Today, some of you may know it as the Heinrich Pyramid.
So, if you’re looking to improve your knowledge of aviation safety and how it could apply to your job, I highly recommend you search the internet for gems like H.W. or review current safety programs that might just help you save a few jobs or, better yet, a lot of lives.
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